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This article focuses on the specific features of the exposure to interest rate risk and the hedging strategies
of life insurance companies and pension funds, stemming from the long-term nature of their commitments.
In particular, the combination of guaranteed returns and numerous contingency clauses may complicate
the liability management of life insurers and defined-benefit pension funds, especially given the uneven
regulatory environment that is currently undergoing major changes. Admittedly, this problem also exists for
other financial institutions, in particular banks, but the latter offer fewer and less diversified long-term
guarantees. For life insurance companies and defined-benefit pension funds, interest rate risk is therefore
more complex to assess and more difficult to manage.
However, these institutional investors have become major players in the financial arena: in France, life
insurers’ assets total some EUR 900 billion and life insurance products account for almost one-third of the
financial investment of households. In the euro area, at the end of the third quarter of 2004, the liabilities of
life insurance companies and pension funds stood at EUR 3,660 billion.1 In the United States, life insurance
technical reserves amounted to USD 970 billion at end-2003 2 and public and private defined-benefit
pension funds managed assets worth USD 4,300 billion3,in spite of the sharp growth in defined-contribution
pension funds and individual pension savings accounts whose risks are borne by the policyholders.
Consequently, the authorities are assessing the implications, in terms of financial stability, of the strategies
of these investors, whose solvency depends on the sound management of interest rate risk. The BIS
annual report 2004 recalls that some life insurance companies failed in 2003 in Germany and the United
Kingdom “as a result of losses due to overly generous polices that had induced companies to look for
higher returns in riskier investments”. Similarly, the value of certain pension fund assets appears lower
than that of their liabilities which could indicate an inappropriate asset/liability management strategy.
The assessment of interest rate risk is rendered more complicated by the fact that life insurance companies
are active in a number of areas, and available data are not always suitable for these purposes.
The authors would like to thank C. Clausse (Predica), M. Piermay (Fixage), J. Prohin (Assurances générales de France), F. Robinet (AXA), É. Viet
(JP Morgan Securities) and P.-J. Vouette  (Commission de contrôle des assurances, des mutuelles et des institutions de prévoyance – CCAMIP)
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2 Source: Insurance Information Institute, Facts and Statistics. US life insurance companies also manage pension funds. Their total
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Part 1 of this study presents the specific features of the balance sheets of these institutional investors, in
particular those relating to the structure of their liabilities. Given the specific nature of these liabilities, the
most simple measures of interest rate risk are not appropriate. The necessary adjustments to the traditional
approach to interest rate risk assessment are then presented.
Part 2 examines the interest rate risk management strategies used by these investors. In order to comply
with regulatory and market constraints, these institutions have adjusted their overall asset and liability
management (ALM) strategy, in particular by increasing their use of derivatives. These strategies are
analysed in the light of the new accounting and prudential standards (US GAAP – Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles –, International Financial Reporting Standards – IFRS, and Solvency II for European
insurers), which are currently being implemented. These standards are likely to foster a degree of uniformity
at the international level and bring about changes in asset and liability management with possible
consequences for financial stability.
The interest rate risk management strategies of life insurance companies and pension funds may therefore
have certain repercussions in terms of financial stability. More specifically, they might have a procyclical
impact on market movements, produce temporary distortions in relative prices of different asset classes or
contribute to an increase in the credit risk of these institutions.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 97
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F
inancial institutions started to realise the
importance of interest rate risk in the 1980s
in the wake of the failure of the US Savings
and Loans institutions. Since then, theoretical and
technological advances as well as progress in terms
of prudential regulation have allowed financial
institutions to refine their analysis and
management of interest rate risk. But where do life
insurance companies and defined-benefit pension
funds stand?
The stakes for institutional investors are very
significant, but differ in the United States and
Europe, and even in France. Indeed, while there are
life insurance companies throughout Europe and the
United States, pension funds – due to the differences
in the legislation governing pension systems – are
only found in the United States and certain European
countries such as the United Kingdom (with assets
representing over 90% of GDP) and the Netherlands,
Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland (where they
represent over 100% of GDP). Nevertheless, there
are similarities between the liabilities of life insurers
and defined-benefit pension funds and these
liabilities entail an interest rate risk, which, if not
properly understood, could destabilise these
institutions.
Owing to their balance sheet structure, these
institutions are exposed to an increase or a decline
in interest rates: a fall in interest rates reduces
future interest margins as the return on new assets
may be insufficient to meet interest payments at
the rate guaranteed by contracts issued prior to this
decline; a rise in interest rates reduces the market
value of the assets, in particular those of bond
portfolios, and simultaneously triggers contract
terminations, in particular in the case of those with
lower guaranteed returns than those offered by new
contracts. These features require specific interest
rate risk management strategies whose effects must
be assessed both within the institutions themselves
and at a more macrofinancial level.
1| CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE INTEREST RATE RISK
OF THESE INVESTORS
The specific nature of the balance sheet structure
of life insurance companies and defined-benefit
pension funds must be taken into account when
assessing their interest rate risk.
1|1 Specific features
of balance sheets in terms
of the maturity of liabilities and
the numerous contingency clauses
LIFE INSURERS
The activity of life insurance companies has
undergone major changes over the past two decades.
Traditional life insurance involves a commitment to
pay the policyholder (or its beneficiaries) a given
sum at a given date, triggered by either a specific
event relating to the life of the policyholder or by
the latter’s death, or a commitment to pay the
policyholder instalments (annuities). The lower
interest rate environment, together with the tax
breaks offered and the uncertainty about the future
of pension systems, has increasingly prompted savers
to take out contracts guaranteeing a return
– fixed or variable – over a given period. In Europe,
two types of life insurance contracts are generally
offered: unit-linked policies and “traditional policies”.
In the first case, the market risk is largely borne by
the policyholder (as is the case for traditional asset
management); in the second case, specific guarantees
protect policyholders from some market risks, as
payments are guaranteed ex ante either by a fixed
rate of return, or by a guaranteed minimum rate of
1 Set by regulation at 85% in France; in the United States, the share in the profits of “Universal Life” insurance contracts is not set down by law.
In the United Kingdom, bonus payments on “with-profits contracts” are also discretionary.98 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
ARTICLES
Interest rate risk management by life insurance companies and pension funds
return plus a share in the profits.1 These guarantees
are equivalent to embedded options, linked to
liabilities on the balance sheet. Life insurance
products offer a wider range of options: in addition
to possible guaranteed returns, the option of choosing
between a single payment on expiry or a series of
payments, the option of using the present value of
the insurance policy as collateral in order to borrow,
the option of increasing instalments on fixed-return
contracts, the option of surrendering the contract or
suspending premium payments, the option of
extending or renewing a contract, etc.
Although insurance companies sought to develop
unit-linked policies, in which risks are entirely borne
by policyholders, traditional policies, guaranteeing
a minimum return, proved more popular. In France,
for example, the latter grew by 13% in 2003,
compared with negative growth of 7% for unit-linked
policies.
In addition to shareholders’ equity, life insurance
companies’ main liabilities are payments to
policyholders, which are covered by technical
reserves, i.e. assets equivalent to the present value
of liabilities. The discount rate therefore plays a key
role (a rate arbitrarily set at a high level would result
in an excessive reduction in the present value of
liabilities) and explains why the choice of this rate
is subject to regulation.
In December 2003, the amount of technical reserves
for France reached EUR 771 billion (French
Federation of Insurance Companies – FFSA),
showing that households are increasingly using
tax-free savings products as a substitute for funded
savings: in the euro area, at the end of the third
quarter of 2004, total outstandings stood at
EUR 3,660 billion, for life insurance companies and
pension funds (ECB).2 For the United States, at
end-2003, with life insurance companies’ liabilities
totalling USD 3,770 billion, life insurance technical
reserves reached USD 970 billion and those relating
to their pension funds USD 1,730 billion (source:
Insurance Information Institute).3
The asset structure of life insurance companies differs
across countries; in particular, Continental Europe and
the United States favour fixed income products more
than the United Kingdom where fund managers
prefer equities, which, historically, have higher
long-run returns than debt securities. In France,
according to the activity report of the Commission de
contrôle des assurances (2002/2003), at end-2002, bonds
accounted for 80% of assets held by life insurance
companies, compared with 13% for equities and other
variable-yield securities. In the United States, over a
third of life insurance companies’ assets consist of
corporate bonds whose yield is higher that that of
government bonds but which also have greater default
and liquidity risks.
2 In Europe, at end-2002, the United Kingdom was the largest market with outstandings of almost EUR 1,500 billion, followed by France and
Germany (a little less than EUR 600 billion).
3 Other liabilities mainly consist of reserves relating to exposures to specific contracts held by private pension funds.
In countries where pension funds exist, life
insurance companies’ liabilities include both
exposures to traditional life insurance products and
pension fund management products.
PENSION FUNDS
Pension funds currently form the second largest
group of institutional investors worldwide (behind
insurance companies) with assets totalling an
estimated USD 8.000 billion for OECD countries
in 2003 (OECD). While, at the outset in Anglo-Saxon
countries, pension funds were almost exclusively
defined-benefit schemes, they are no longer in a
majority and are not offered any more to those
entering the job market. In the United Kingdom,
some companies have even closed these funds for
all their employees (nevertheless maintaining the
benefits accrued up to their closure), offering instead
defined-contribution funds that transfer all the
market risks to future pensioners.
Source: Mercer, Oliver, Wyman (2004)
Lecture: The large proportion of equities can be attributed to British life insurance
companies, for which these securities comprise over 40% of assets.
Asset structure of life insurance companies:
Comparison between the United States and Europe
(end-2002,%)
s e t a t S d e t i n U e p o r u E
s e i t i d i u q i L 7 . 2 1 . 2
s d n o b t n e m n r e v o G 1 . 6 7 . 2 3
s d n o b e t a r o p r o C 4 . 4 3 6 2
s d n o b e g a g t r o M 7 . 6 1 0 . 5
s n a o l r e h t O 1 . 5 1 2 . 3
s e i t i u q E 2 . 3 8 . 3 2
y t i u q E e t a v i r P 0 . 2 5 . 1
e t a t s e l a e R 1 . 5 1 7 . 5
s r e h t O 7 . 4 0 . 0
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The funds collected by these institutions stem
from, on the one hand, contributions from
companies (for private pension funds) and general
government (for public pension funds), and, on the
other, from employees. For defined-benefit pension
funds, the options relating to liabilities on future
pensioners are not based on, and this is a key
difference vis-à-vis contracts offered by life
insurance companies, a pre-specified guaranteed
return, but in general a percentage of the final
salary (according to the age and length of working
life, with a possible subsequent indexation).
The liabilities of these funds are therefore
dependent on the growth rate of wages, which
complicates the asset allocation strategy as the
minimum return required is not known ex ante.
In the case of companies’ dedicated pension funds,
the asset structure of defined-benefit pension funds
is determined by the company. Indeed, the company
guarantees the benefits, even though in the medium
term it might have to pass on the risks to the
employees by reducing dividend payments in the
event of the pension fund experiencing solvency
problems.4
In the United States, equities are predominant in
funds’ portfolios, even though they only accounted
for 58% at end-2002 (with 43% in US equities, and
often a large share of the companies’ own shares)
compared with 66% at end-1999; bonds only
accounted for 15% and money market instruments
and other assets, 27%. In addition to their strong
historical performance and the fact that purchasing
their own shares provides a guaranteed source of
income for companies, one of the other reasons that
these investors place such a high share of equities
in their portfolio stems from the fact that they are
allowed to use the expected return on their assets
as the discount rate for their liabilities. Although the
Securities and Exchange Commission issued
reservations about the way liabilities have been
discounted in recent years and recommended the
use of highly-rated corporate bonds, in 2003,
discount rates were often around 6% (The Economist,
30/10/2004, p.88) while AAA corporate bond yields
averaged 5%.
The stock market crash of 2000 resulted in a sharp
fall in the value of their assets, which, combined
with a decline in interest rates (which increases
the value of liabilities), led to an underfunding of
many pension funds. For example, while the
expected return on assets of US defined-benefit
pension funds5 was 9% for 2000 to 2002, the actual
return on assets was only 0.61% in 2000, -5.30%
in 2001 and -6.55% in 2002, thus resulting in an
overestimation of 38.24% in cumulative terms
(Ryan and Fabozzi, 2003). Consequently, the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., an organisation
that guarantees (to a limited extent) the liabilities
of private defined-benefit pension funds,
announced a record deficit of USD 23 billion on
30 September 2004 for dedicated corporate pension
funds alone (compared with a surplus of
USD 7.7 billion in 2001) and a potential additional
exposure of USD 96 billion (USD 10.9 billion
in 2001) relating to the deficits of non-investment
grade corporate pension funds alone.
In Europe, in countries where pension funds play
an important role in the funding of pensions
(Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom), the share of equities in portfolios is also
very high: 67% in the United Kingdom, 43% in the
Netherlands (figures 2003, source: UBS).
4 Risks may also affect shareholders via a fall in the value of their shares and/or dividends.
5 Statistics for the 380 pension funds of S&P 500 companies.100 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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Box
Specific features of interest rate risk in life insurance companies and banks
A comparison between the balance sheets of life insurance companies and banks seems to reveal a number of specific
features:
• the production process in insurance companies is different from that of banks, as premiums are calculated while the
liabilities are not fully known;
• initial exposure is on the liabilities side of the balance sheet as insurance polices are converted into liabilities represented
by technical reserves and then invested in financial assets that constitute the company’s assets (whereas banks’ exposure
is initially on the asset side via lending activities);
• the average maturity of liabilities is longer, for instance that of annuities, than in banks.
In a financial environment where the participants and transactions are less segmented, these differences with banks
should nevertheless be put into perspective (Briys and de Varenne, 1996):
• the sale of an insurance contract is comparable to the sale of a put (the policyholder has the right to sell the asset whose
value is guaranteed); banks have the same type of problem with mortgage loans with embedded prepayment options (sale
of a call);
• bank deposits on the liabilities side can be seen as liquidity insurance for customers. In this respect, banks, like insurance
companies, benefit from the application of the principle of risk pooling (law of large numbers);
• due to the impact of the embedded options (see below) the difference between the effective duration of liabilities of life
insurance companies and those of banks is generally lower than that of their maturities.
Nevertheless, the degree of segmentation between these two players varies across countries: while in the United States
banks do not offer insurance services, in France bancassurance companies collect over half the life insurance premiums.
1|2 Implications in terms of interest
rate risk assessment
The analysis of the balance sheets of life insurers
and defined-benefit pension funds shows the
maturity of liabilities and the weight of embedded
options and their significance in assessing the
interest rate risk of these players.
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET AND LIABILITY MANAGEMENT
(ALM)
ALM involves structuring the balance sheet in such
a way that all changes in the value of liabilities
corresponds to an equivalent change in the value of
assets (or vice versa). Theoretically, the most simple
and most effective technique consists in matching
all the individual flows (“cash flow matching”), but
the transaction costs are high. Moreover, it is not
always possible to match all cash flows individually.
For example, for life insurers and pension funds, it
is difficult to find assets with maturities (and/or
durations) as long as those of certain liabilities.
Furthermore, the net profitability of any institution
attempting to hedge all cash flows one by one and
having to buy options to hedge those sold (or “given”)
to policyholders would probably be negative.
In practice, ALM aims to reduce the gap between
the sensitivity of assets and that of liabilities to
interest rate changes. Duration can initially be used
as a proxy for sensitivity.
It is therefore necessary to refine this management
approach by measuring not only the duration (which
estimates first order effects of a change in the rate
of return on assets – or liabilities) but also the
convexity, which can be used to estimate second
order effects – and therefore twists in the yield curve
(see appendix).Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 101
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FACTORING IN EMBEDDED OPTIONS
The interest rate risk of an institution whose balance
sheet contains embedded options, which could change
the size of the cash flows in the event of a movement
in interest rates, cannot however be analysed with
traditional tools. Babbel (2001) shows that, for US life
insurance companies, if the impact of changes in
interest rates on cash flows or changes in the shape of
the yield curve (or possibly credit risk) are not taken
into account, this results in the effective duration of
assets being overestimated by around 20% and of
liabilities by over 200%. In France, where life
insurance contracts can be transferred free of
inheritance tax, they may have a very long duration
but, as policyholders can exercise their call options at
any time, the effective duration may also be very short.
It is easy to see that one of the main reasons why life
insurance companies fail is due to an inaccurate
estimate of the sensitivity of technical reserves
to changes in interest rates (e.g. Nissan Mutual Life
in Japan in 1997, Equitable Life in the United
Kingdom between 1994 and 2000 or Mannheimer
Lebensversicherung in Germany in 2003).
In the case of defined-benefit pension funds, the
difficulty in estimating the duration of liabilities
chiefly concerns the cash or annuity option, as the
maturity of the annuity has to be calculated in a
probabilistic manner using mortality tables. Given
that mortality rates fluctuate less than interest rates,
liabilities are more sensitive to interest rate risk; asset
and liability management should therefore favour
fixed income securities portfolios. Yet, not only is
the share of bonds relatively low, but there also seems
to be a large mismatch between the duration of assets
(bonds held) and liabilities, often due to the lack of
long-term bonds. For instance, the duration of the
liabilities of the UK defined-benefit pension funds
varies between 16 and 21 years but the duration of
the longest bond (i.e. The over-15-year Gilt) was until
recently only 16 years. Consequently, over 70% of
the funds have a duration of liabilities that exceeds
that of the longest bond index. While this situation
is fairly advantageous in the event of a rise in the
level of interest rates, it nevertheless entails a
sizeable risk in the event of a decline; the risk
measured will be all the greater for life insurers when
they are required, like corporate pension funds, to
mark to market all the components of their balance
sheet (in accordance with the new European
accounting rules).
Given the large number of embedded options to be
factored in by these institutions, a good solution for
assessing their interest rate risk is to use the effective
duration and convexity, i.e. to consider the actual
changes in the discounted values of assets and
liabilities in relation to one or more interest rate
development scenarios, bearing in mind the
consequences on the cash flows themselves
(see appendix). Empirical studies tend to show that
by taking into account the duration and the
convexity, it is possible to hedge between 90% and
95% of interest rate risk. Once an acceptable gap
has been determined between the sensitivity of
assets and that of liabilities, in accordance with the
prudential rules or the institution’s internal rules,
the optimal methods must be established (in terms
of cost, flexibility, liquidity, accounting, etc.) in order
to observe this limit.
DIFFICULTIES IN MODELLING EMBEDDED OPTIONS
Factoring options into the calculation of the duration
and the convexity can be relatively simple as long
as the behaviour of the option holders is rational
and only depends on the price of the underlying
asset (i.e. changes in interest rates). However, this
is not always the case for life insurance
policyholders. Initial attempts to include embedded
options were frustrated by a lack of data on the
behaviour of policyholders as option holders,
i.e. the difficulty in modelling the probability of the
options being exercised according to the level of
interest rates, tax treatment, age, etc.
Life insurance companies incur a wide range of risks,
as do financial institutions, but some risks are
specific to the former: on the one hand, natural
disasters or new diseases, which could increase the
mortality rate and, on the other, the rise in longevity
and the ageing of the population. The affects of the
economic cycle on the behaviour of policyholders
may also be ambiguous: call features may be
triggered during recessions, as well as in the event
of a rise in interest rates, which is generally the result
of strong growth in economic activity. It is possible
to refine the analysis of the impact of a change in
interest rates on cash flows by estimating the
correlation between the economic cycle and interest
rates but as options are not always exercised
rationally, historical behaviour data remain essential.
Unfortunately, over the past two decades, data were102 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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collected against the backdrop of declining interest
rates whereas the current direction of interest rates
appears to be upward.
Over the past decade, thanks to technological
advances ALM models have become more
sophisticated, incorporating a number of risk factors.
These models are known as Dynamic Financial
Analysis models (DFA) and in some countries such
as the United States and Canada their use has been
imposed by regulators. According to a study by
KPMG (2002), models used fall into three main
categories:
• static models that only consider the financial
situation of an insurance company at a specific point
in time;
• dynamic models that incorporate changes in the
financial situation in a deterministic manner with
stress test scenarios; for example for insurance
companies, the IMF incorporates interest rate
movements of +/- 100 to 200 basis points; the
Commission de contrôle des assurances, in France,
recommends that a sudden shock of 300 to 400 basis
points be modelled, with or without changes in the
shape of the yield curve, as insurers choose;
• dynamic models that incorporate changes in
the financial situation in a probabilistic manner
(by generating random variations of risk variables
and considering their dependence).
To date, life insurance companies have been using
deterministic dynamic models but they do not
always sufficiently take account of options “given”
to policyholders. The future European prudential
regulation, Solvency II, will nevertheless require
insurers to factor in these options.
2| INTEREST RATE RISK
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
The choice between the different interest rate risk
management strategies is based on a trade-off
between, on the one hand, financial constraints
(liquidity, transaction costs, etc.) and regulatory
constraints (accounting or prudential), and, on the
other, the efficiency of hedging. In this respect, the
use of derivatives seems important both in the initial
asset/liability strategy and in the subsequent
dynamic adjustments of interest rate risk hedging.
2|1 Risk management principles
The constraint of life insurance companies and
defined-benefit pension funds stems from their
long-term liabilities combined with the large number
of embedded options they “give” to policyholders.
These institutional investors must structure6 their
assets in order to reduce their exposure to changes
in interest rates and take account of embedded
options.
One of the key parameters of asset and liability
management is the rate of return guaranteed
contractually to policyholders; the level of this rate,
which is contingent on regulations specific to each
country, partly determines the extent of exposure
to the risk of a fall in interest rates of life insurance
companies and defined-benefit pension funds.
By exercising their right to increase the instalments
when their contract’s guaranteed rate is higher than
the market rate, policyholders reduce the
profitability of these institutions (which must then
offer a higher rate of return than that of the market).
In France, a reform was implemented in June 1995
to preclude this risk, reducing the maximum
guaranteed rate of return from 4.50% to 3.50% and
setting a limit of 60% of the average yield on
long-term government bonds. Moreover, since this
reform, many new French life insurance contracts
only offer capital guarantees. From this point of view,
exposure to the risk of a decline in interest rates has
become less significant. Similarly, in  1994,
Finanstilsynet (the Danish financial supervisory
authority) brought down the maximum rate of return
that could be guaranteed to policyholders by life
insurance companies and pension funds from 4.5%
to 2.5% (and then to 1.5% in 1999). However,
German insurance companies, which still guarantee
a high return (between 3.25% and 4% according to
their contracts), are more inclined to purchase
products that allow them to hedge against a fall in
interest rates. Due to the complexity of German
6 Even though the interest rate risk management of life insurance companies may also consist in managing liabilities via the characteristics of
the contracts offered to policyholders, which was often the case in the 1990s.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 103
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regulations, insurers often use structured bonds for
hedging interest rate risk. In theory, while they could
use floors, a series of options enabling them to hedge
against a decline in interest rates, German insurers
are not authorised to apply collateral agreements,
which are a prerequisite for all OTC transactions.7
This prevents them de facto from using these types
of financial instruments, as their counterparties
would not be willing to bear this credit risk.
Life insurance companies and defined-benefit
pension funds are also exposed to a rise in interest
rates. When interest rates rise, policyholders may
wish to terminate their contracts to benefit from
more attractive investment opportunities. Here
again, the contractual obligations are decisive for
assessing scale of this risk. This risk is not very
significant for German insurers, as German
regulations harshly penalise policyholders wishing
to surrender their life insurance contracts before
expiry. Furthermore, most life insurance contracts
in Germany have a maturity of 20 or even 30 years.
In France, however, a rise in interest rates is the main
risk to which life insurers are exposed, as the
minimum maturity of contracts is relatively low
(8 years) and policyholders can terminate contracts
without penalties after this time. A traditional
hedging technique consists in buying caps, which
are options that protect the buyer against a rise in
interest rates.8 They are often indexed on the
constant maturity swap (CMS) rate, or constant
maturity bond rate – CMR)9: these are financial
instruments in which a short-term interest rate (for
example the six-month Euribor rate) is exchanged
for a swap rate with a long constant maturity rate
(i.e. 7 or 10 years). Lastly, in the Netherlands,
regulations impose an indexation of returns on life
insurance contracts on products such as seven-year
constant maturity swaps, making the use of such
derivatives by Dutch insurance companies
particularly common.
More generally, in addition to managing risk, asset
and liability management naturally takes profit
considerations into account. Given that over the very
long-term equities have a higher risk/return profile
7 These collateral agreements are based on the principle that an institution’s exposure to credit risk must be entirely covered by collateral of an
equivalent value to the credit risk.
8 French life insurance companies can easily use OTC derivatives products, as they can apply collateral agreements.
9 For instance, a ten-year CMR bond is a bond whose yield-to-maturity is equivalent to that of a notional fungible Treasury bond (OAT) with a
maturity of exactly 10 years. The yield on the CMR 10 is obtained by interpolation of 10-year OAT yields on the secondary market (source: site
www.aft.fr).
than bonds, some insurance companies and pension
funds favour equity investments. The regulatory
framework is therefore a determining factor for the
weight of equities in the asset mix across countries.
For example, UK insurance companies are
authorised to hold a higher percentage of equities
than their counterparts in Continental Europe.
Furthermore, the structure of financial markets also
influences the characteristics of assets held (IMF,
April 2004): in the United Kingdom, the corporate
bond segment is less developed than in the United
States, which explains the lower weight of these
instruments in the asset mix of life insurance
companies (around 20%, or three times lower than
for US life insurance companies) and the heavy
weight of equities (over 40% in the United Kingdom
compared with less than 5% in the United States).
The limitations of such strategies nevertheless came
to light when the Internet bubble burst in 2000,
hitting those pension funds with high proportions
of equities the hardest. A number of these
institutions were then faced with a scissor effect:
a decline in the value of their equities, recorded on
the assets side of the balance sheet, and a fall in
interest rates causing the present value of their
liabilities, discounted using bond yields, to rise.
This effect sometimes resulted in an underfunding,
or even the insolvency of these institutions, as was
the case for some Anglo-Saxon pension funds.
2|2 Dynamic adjustments
The various initial asset/liability strategies based on
duration and convexity make it possible to hedge
interest rate risk for expectations of small changes
in interest rates over a short-term horizon. In order
to hedge interest rate risk perfectly, derivatives that
allow the hedging of all possible states of nature
would have to be purchased, but this would entail
too high a cost. Therefore, it is less efficient to hedge
interest rate risk for a significant change in interest
rates, which is less probable and/or at a longer
horizon. It is thus necessary to adjust the balance
sheet structure when the level of interest rates
fluctuates significantly and the likelihood of certain104 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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scenarios increases. This is particularly the case for
managing a risk generated by a sale initially not
hedged with options (guarantees given to
policyholders) whose probability of being exercised
varies in line with changes in interest rates. The term
“dynamic adjustment” reflects the fact that hedging
adjustments are made as market conditions change.
Dynamic adjustments are made either on securities
markets, or on derivatives markets. For example,
when interest rates fall sharply, new premiums
collected by insurance companies may be higher
than expected, which may cause the effective
duration of the liabilities to rise. This might then
require buying fixed income products with a high
duration or fixed-for-variable rate swaps, which can
be used to synthetically extend the duration of the
assets.
For example, General Accident turned to derivatives
to manage its interest rate risk (Risk Magazine,
December 2004) when it bought Provident Mutual,
which had sold annuities guaranteeing a rate of
return of 8%. In October 1998, General Accident
expected a sharp decline in interest rates, and bought
(fixed-rate receiver) swaptions totalling GBP 3 billion
with a maturity of between 15 and 30 years.
Dynamic adjustments are relatively effective in the
short term, but risks may persist if the upward or
downward trend in interest rates is lasting (or
accelerates), forcing institutions to constantly
readjust their positions, without necessarily reaching
an exposure level below their tolerance limit.
These strategies may also be problematic if they are
implemented during periods of high interest rate
volatility, as volatility makes the management of
changes in the sensitivity of assets and liabilities
more costly (and more difficult if it is associated with
a decline in market liquidity). Indeed, in such
periods, the frequency of readjustments increases
(as thresholds are more frequently breached),
meaning that the number of transactions and thus
the cost of hedging both rise.
Hedging costs are taken into account in ALM
strategies. However, the more efficient the hedging,
the higher the adjustment costs. And the higher the
likelihood of a hedged event occurring, the higher
the option premium used to hedge the event.
In  financial terms, the more the option is
“in-the-money”, the more its price goes up and vice
versa. Consequently, these types of option
adjustments must be made sufficiently early so that
the likelihood of the risk occurring is not too high.
However, if this probability is low, some institutions
prefer to retain the risk (up to authorised limits) and
delay the use of dynamic adjustments. For instance,
in early 2004, when long-term interest rates were
extremely low, certain life insurers, which were
exposed to a risk of policyholders increasing their
instalments, appear to have decided against hedging
this risk by buying floors, as the options appeared
too expensive.
Hedging strategies using derivatives also entail
other risks, such as credit risk, when the products
are purchased OTC10, between the institution and
its counterparty. Therefore, these institutions must
be particularly vigilant with regard to the
creditworthiness of their counterparty and the type
of contract governing their relations throughout the
life of the derivative product.
Furthermore, some institutions may be exposed to
liquidity risk given the size of their hedging positions
and the limited number of counterparties on such
products.
Lastly, residual interest rate risks include those
arising from the correlation between yields and
prices of other financial products that pension funds
and life insurance companies hold as assets.
In particular, these comprise equities and real estate
assets whose prices also depend on interest rates.
In general, stress test scenarios simulated by
financial intermediaries take account of these risks
even though they increase the complexity and the
model risk.
2|3 Influence of regulations
on asset and liability management
In addition to market considerations and the specific
features of the products used, changes in the
accounting and prudential environment have a
major impact on the management of interest rate
10 If this derivative product is purchased on an organised market, the credit risk for the institution is almost inexistent. However, given the
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risk, for both pension funds and life insurance
companies. The regulatory framework may affect
the rigour of these institutions’ asset and liability
management. Testifying to the influence of
regulations on asset and liability management, the
first insurance companies participating on interest
rate derivatives markets were British, Dutch and
Danish, i.e. residents of countries where regulations
have developed the most in terms of risk analysis
using mark-to-market valuation techniques.
In most countries, it was the continual decline in
bond yields that led supervisory authorities to
change and regulate the way in which liabilities are
calculated. Indeed, in a low interest rate
environment, it became inconceivable to discount
liabilities at a pre-specified interest rate, with
no relation to market rates and sometimes above
the yields on bonds. Moreover, leaving the choice
of liability discount rate entirely to the discretion
of the institutions could also entail risks in terms
of solvability, arising from the temptation to
overestimate this rate. Lastly, the valuation method
for liabilities is inseparable from that of assets.
The example of Denmark is particularly revealing
of the importance of regulations. Before 1999, the
discount rate was largely left to the discretion of
life insurance companies and pension funds. After
this date, in the light of the protracted decline in
bond yields11, Finanstilsynet defined and
harmonised the rules relating to the liability
discount rate. The Danish accounting reform
implemented on 1 January 2002, then encouraged
these institutions to adopt fair value methods earlier
than their European counterparts. Furthermore,
in 2001, in the wake of a change in the Insurance
Business Act that relaxed the rules regarding
insurance firms’ investment, Finanstilsynet
introduced two stress test scenarios to assess the
financial soundness of life insurance companies.
Against this backdrop, a report published by
Finanstilsynet showed that, in 2003, out of 71 life
insurers, 49 used financial derivatives for their ALM.
Two consequences emerged from these reforms.
Firstly, the main life insurance companies and
pension funds shifted out of equities into bonds
(see table below), when these new accounting
standards were implemented.
11 The regular decrease in minimum returns offered to policyholders is not a sufficient and lasting solution for the decline in bond yields.
12 IXIS-CIB (2005)
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Secondly, these companies extended the duration
of their assets in order to better replicate that of their
liabilities. This is reflected by the change in 15-year
euro forward swap rates; these rates show a flattening
of the yield curve between  2001 and  2002,
corresponding to the implementation of these
accounting standards which contributed to this trend.
15-year euro forward swap rates
(in basis points)
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A similar accounting reform took place in the United
Kingdom; under FRS 17, pension funds are obliged
to mark to market their liabilities (on the basis of
current yields on AA-rated notional bonds). Similarly,
prudential regulation was tightened for life insurance
companies in December 2004 (PS 04/16).
In the Netherlands, where the duration of pension
fund liabilities appears to be around 15 years while
that of bonds on the asset side appears to be
five years12, the Financieel Toetsingskader (FTK),
which should taken effect in 2006, will also oblige
life insurance companies and pension funds to
mark to market assets and liabilities and thus
discount liabilities at the risk-free rate. At present,
liabilities are discounted at a pre-specified 4%.
Furthermore, these institutions must pass three
prudential tests, thus reinforcing the effects of the
new accounting standards in terms of asset and
liability management.
More generally, in Europe, changes to the regulatory
framework comprise two reforms: first, an
accounting reform (IFRS and more specifically
International Accounting Standards – IAS 19), which106 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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requires the pension funds of European listed
companies to mark their liabilities to market as of
1 January 2005;13 second, a prudential reform with
the draft European Insurance Directive, Solvency II,
(set to be implemented by end-2007) should prompt
insurance companies to shore up their asset and
liability management.
In the United States, the discount rate for pension
fund liabilities is still being fiercely debated. At this
time, the recommended discount rate is the
long-term government bond yield, under SFAS 87;
but in the current environment of very low interest
rates, these institutions are authorised to use, on a
temporary basis, a higher rate, i.e. based on the yield
of a long-term AA-rated corporate bond (Pension
Funding Equity Act of 2004, approved by Congress
in April 2004).
Moreover, the valuation of assets (under SFAS 87) is
currently smoothed (delayed recognition principle),
but proposals underway recommend marking assets
to market. Smoothing decreases the volatility of asset
prices, but results in de facto a skewed assessment of
risk-return. Such an accounting method therefore
encourages equity investment. After the collapse of
the stock market in early 2000, this smoothing
technique was harshly criticised for not having brought
to light the underfunding of many pension funds.
At present, pension funds are so underfunded that it
would be difficult to impose market value accounting.
The accounting and prudential rules that may directly
or indirectly affect the asset and liability management
of life insurance companies and defined-benefit
pension funds are constantly changing. Their
repercussions on market dynamics and financial
stability therefore require constant supervision.
13 The valuation methods of insurance companies’ liabilities are still under discussion.
Consequences for Financial Stability
The recent results of stress test scenarios carried out by life insurance companies and pension funds in
OECD countries are, in general, encouraging and show an improvement in the efficiency of their hedging
strategies, which has enabled them to reduce their exposure to interest rate risk.
It nevertheless appears that these strategies, and in particular dynamic hedging, may have an impact on
financial stability and financial markets.
Hedging techniques may have procyclical effects on market movements. In addition to bouts of increased
volatility and a temporary amplification of market movements, they may also hinder the smooth functioning
of financial markets: hedging transactions tend to disrupt the liquidity of the markets due to the amounts
involved and the concentration of the participants. The risk of pro-cyclical effects is more marked in the
case of dynamic hedging. For instance, the comparison with the asset and liability management of Housing
Government Sponsored Enterprises (Housing GSE) in the United States is telling. These organisations
face fairly similar dynamic hedging problems to those of life insurance companies and pension funds, as
they also manage items that are sensitive to interest rate fluctuations and are exposed to significant
embedded options. According to a study by Moody’s (2004), in one day, an adjustment of three months in
the net duration of GSEs (due, admittedly, to a very large fluctuation in interest rates) would require using
swaps worth USD 50 billion, or 14% of the daily turnover of the interest rate derivative market.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 107
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The asset and liability management of defined-benefit pension funds and life insurance companies could
affect market prices, in particular given the new accounting and prudential rules that require institutions to
mark assets and liabilities to market. Portfolio shifts, out of equities (whose prices are traditionally more
volatile than those of OECD government bonds) and into bonds, carried out by some life insurers and
pension funds, could change the relative value of bonds in relation to that of equities and the risk premia
in the different markets. This is especially the case if flows are very significant. Yet, since the equity market
collapse of 2000, some pension funds of major UK or Dutch companies have sold off some or all of their
equity portfolios in order to buy bonds. Similarly, between 1999 and 2004, the share of equities in European
insurance companies’ portfolios has halved, according to the European Insurance Committee.
These portfolio shifts are often into long-term (or even very long-term) bonds, which could significantly
change the shape of the yield curve, like in the United Kingdom where the yield curve between 10 and
30 years is already inverted. However, a flattening of the long end of the term structure of interest rates
corresponds to a decline in the term premium (spread between very long-term yields and long-term yields),
i.e. less protection against unexpected inflation and liquidity risks.
However, these effects may be only temporary because, aside from one-off portfolio shifts, subsequent
adjustments would only concern the asset allocation of new cash flows.
Furthermore, although new interest rate risk management techniques have made ALM more rigorous,
when they result in shifts from equities to bonds, they also imply a decline in expected future returns.
In order to offset this decline, life insurance companies and pension funds may be tempted to use leverage
products. In countries where this is authorised (in particular in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the
United States and Scandinavian countries), these institutions have increased their investments in hedge
funds and in new financial products such as CDOs. According to a study published at the end of 20031,
60% of institutions in four Scandinavian countries had invested in hedge funds; moreover, as the percentages
were still low (2% of total assets), the study shows that the majority of managers were planning to increase
the share of this investment in the near term. Given that the aim of asset and liability management is to
reduce the exposure to risk, it would be unfortunate and paradoxical if such strategies resulted in a higher
level of exposure for some life insurance companies and pension funds due to excessive risk-taking.
In general, the increased sophistication of interest rate risk management requires the use of option strategies.
While the latter reduce the interest rate risk of individual institutions, they nevertheless have an ambiguous
impact at the macrofinancial level. With an increasing concentration of OTC derivatives activity among a
small number of major investment banks, which may result in an increase in credit and liquidity risk, there
may be a greater risk of contagion between the life insurance and pension fund sectors on the one hand,
and the banking sector on the other.
Lastly, even if one way or reducing interest rate risk ex ante would be to decrease the number of embedded
options in contracts and therefore to transfer more financial risks to households, it should be borne in mind
that the latter are not necessarily in a position to support or manage these risks that the financial system
wishes to pass on to them.
1 Ericsson (2003): “Nordic investors increase their alternative investments”, Informed Portfolio Management (IPM) AB,
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The ultimate aim is to measure, in the most accurate
way, the sensitivity of the present value VA of assets
(or liabilities) to a change in interest rates.
We initially take a present value equal to the sum of
all future cash flows discounted at rate R0, assumed
to be a single rate, which is tantamount to a flat yield
curve:











Frederick Macauley (1938) suggested measuring the
sensitivity using duration (weighted average
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John Hicks (1939) favoured the concept of elasticity
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We can also define the concept of modified duration
(MD) which is the relative change in the value of an
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Modified duration is therefore a risk indicator
equivalent to duration and elasticity, differing only
in terms of one factor (the level of interest rates).
By denoting ∆R = R – R0, with R0 the initial rate and
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= MD x ∆R, is equivalent to first-order
approximation of Taylor’s expansion:  MD ≈ .
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Sensitivity calculated in this way is thus only a proxy
for effective sensitivity.
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A better proxy for sensitivity is therefore obtained








A × CX ×(∆R) = MD×∆R+ .
However, the above calculations assume that the
cash flows themselves are not affected by changes
in interest rates (which is not the case where
embedded options exist). Furthermore, cash flows
are discounted at a single rate whereas it is more
realistic to assume a change in interest rates and
therefore a possible change in the shape of the yield
curve. Using Monte-Carlo-type simulations, we can
be more accurate and calculate effective convexity
and duration:
Deff =
V V A A –
+ –
R V A ∆ 2
and
CXeff 2 ) ( R V A ∆
=
2V V V A A A – –
+ –
where V A
– =present value of expected future cash
flows in the case of a decline in interest rates
of ∆R,
V A
+ =present value of expected future cash
flows in the case of a rise in interest rates of  ∆R.
To protect the balance sheet, the interest rate
sensitivity of assets and liabilities must match. In
practice, using a second-order approximation, this
comes down to matching the effective convexity and
duration.